"Adam Wodeham e la logica degli esperimenti mentali: un caso medievale per un modello contemporaneo", un intervento di Michele Saracino (FINO)

Venerdì 30 maggio alle ore 11 avremo il piacere di ospitare Michele Saracino (dottorando presso il consorzio FINO – Filosofia del Nord-Ovest), che terrà un intervento dedicato alla logica degli esperimenti mentali.

L’incontro si svolgerà presso lo Scriptorium (sala della biblioteca), al secondo piano dell’area di Filosofia, Via D’Azeglio 85, Parma.

ecco l'abstract del suo intervento:

Recently, the notion of thought experiment has captured much attention in philosophy, particularly in those fields in which the dialogue between metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of science has progressively developed to be more fruitful and intense. Alongside the reflection aimed at refining the concept, there has been an effort to establish whether and to what extent philosophers and historians could legitimately speak of thought experiments when referring to past theories. In his Lectura Secunda (d. 1, q. 6, §1), Adam Wodeham (1298-1358 ca.) depicts a scenario in which God’s absolute power is uncommonly used to prove the inseparability of enjoyment (fruitio) and pleasure (delectatio) in the beatific vision. This paper aims to show that Wodeham performed a genuine thought experiment. First, I will put Wodeham’s argument into its historical context and I will offer a textual analysis of the main passages. Then I will argue that it can be considered an example of a thought experiment. To support my thesis, I will show that Wodeham’s imaginatio can be well represented by the model (α) built by Häggqvist (2009).1 If true, these results will show how fruitful the dialogue between history of philosophy and analytic metaphilosophy can be, as far as it can also lead to a major theoretical clarification in the current debate about Medieval thought experiments.

 

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